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Region and place I: Institutions1
John Tomaney
University College London, UK
Abstract
The role of institutions in the promotion (or hindrance) of regional development has attracted increasing
attention from scholars and policy-makers. This paper reviews recent contributions to this debate before
sketching elements of a research agenda which addresses some key conjectural, methodological and political
issues.
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I Regions and the ‘institutional
turn’
The role of institutions in the promotion (or hin-
drance) of regional development has attracted
increasing attention from scholars and policy-
makers. In contradistinction to neoclassical and
neoliberal approaches (and the neo-orthodoxy
discussed below), recent contributions to the
debate on institutions and economic develop-
ment share in common a concern with the con-
structive role of the state, including the local and
regional state, in shaping patterns of develop-
ment. Political and administrative decentraliza-
tion – to a variety of spatial scales – is one of the
most important global trends in government and
governance, representing in part a search for
improved development outcomes. In the field
of regional policy studies, these literatures have
profoundly influenced the current interest in
‘place-based’ approaches to territorial develop-
ment, which rest on the claim that effective
institutions make a significant contribution to
the process of regional growth because of their
key role in the interpretation and mediation of
broader economic contexts and through their
leading role in shaping and coordinating incen-
tives for investment and enterprise. It is the role
of political institutions and the claims made for
the role of local and regional governance in the
promotion of regional development that forms
the central focus of this paper.
II Institutions: neo-orthodoxy and
its limits
The neo-orthodox analysis of local develop-
ment is encapsulated in Glaeser’s influential
The Triumph of the City (2012), which accounts
for uneven development in terms of the advan-
tages that densely developed cities (or city-
regions) derive from agglomeration economies,
which are used to explain both urban/rural
disparities and the relative performance of dif-
ferent cities. In this perspective, which draws
on a mix of urban economics and the new
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economic geography, the role of local govern-
ment is limited beyond the provision of basic
guarantees of property rights and social order.
Indeed, ‘the best economic development strat-
egy may be to attract smart people and get out
of the way’ (Glaeser, 2012: 261). Regional
disparities reflect the rational response of agents
to market signals indicating where the best
returns on skills and capital are obtained. This
thinking has contributed to a policy paradigm
emphasizing that interventions should be lim-
ited, ‘spatially blind’ and focus on ‘people’ not
‘places’ – an approach which is reflected, for
instance, in the proposals of the World Bank
(2009), of the Policy Exchange (2008) in the
UK, and of the Grattan Institute (2011) in
Australia.
For Glaeser, local and regional politics con-
tains more dangers than promise:
It’s easy to idolize democracy, but effective city
governments need leaders who govern with a
firm hand, unencumbered by checks and bal-
ances and free from the need to heed the wishes
of every disgruntled citizen . . . robust democ-
racy with its various entrenched constituencies,
often impedes the forceful action that must
be taken to substantially improve urban life.
(Glaeser, 2012: 95)
Thus, the successful public health improve-
ments and crime reductions that occurred in
New York City at the turn of the 20th century
are ascribed to the ‘quasi-military leadership’
of Colonel George E. Waring Jr, the city’s Street
Commissioner. Later examples of successful
urban leaders, according to Glaeser, include Lee
Kwan Yew and Mayor Daly in Chicago. The
naivety of this approach, however, is revealed
in Glaeser’s analysis of the secession of Singa-
pore, which is attributed to ‘irreconcilable dif-
ferences between the puritanical, intellectually
ferocious Lee and the pleasure-loving, aristo-
cratic leader of Malaysia [that] led Singapore
to become an independent city state’ (Glaeser,
2012: 228). As an account of the racial tensions,
geopolitics and ideological conflicts that prefi-
gured the Singaporean city-state, this is, of
course, hopelessly inadequate. Moreover, Sin-
gapore is hardly an exemplar of the market-
driven urban development with its extensive
industrial policy and state intervention in hous-
ing and labour markets (Olds and Yeung, 2004).
The sophisticated econometrics that underpin
Glaeser’s arguments about the productivity
advantages of densely developed cities are
largely absent from his discussion of urban gov-
ernance, which leaves him resting, ultimately,
on the explanatory power of the ‘great man
of history’ approach in the manner of Thomas
Carlyle, the 19th-century English Whig historian.
Some of the inadequacies of the neo-
orthodoxy of local development, including its
treatment of institutions, are highlighted by a
recent study from the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD,
2012). While the power of economic concentra-
tion is incontestable, the OECD’s analysis ques-
tions the extent to which economic growth is
solely associated with densely developed
mega-cities. Statistical analysis demonstrates
that sources of economic growth among OECD
regions are heterogeneous, while the potential
for growth exists in a diversity of locations with
human capital and innovation as key factors.
The study explores why these patterns emerge,
including why some regions become trapped
in low growth equilibriums. A key explanatory
factor for poor economic performance turns out
to be ‘institutional bottlenecks’; including poor
mobilization of stakeholders, lack of continuity
and coherence in the implementation of policies
by institutions, institutional instability, lack of a
common and strategic vision, and lack of capac-
ity and gaps in multi-level governance frame-
works. For the OECD:
Formal and informal institutions that facilitate
negotiation and dialogue among key actors in
order to mobilize and integrate them into the
development process are vital, as are those that
132 Progress in Human Geography 38(1)
 at University College London on August 4, 2014phg.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
enhance policy continuity . . . the challenge is to
create institutions that strengthen the region’s
‘voice’ in dealing with other regions and coun-
tries and those that foster linkages among the
private, public and education sectors. (OECD,
2012: 25)
The OECD study simultaneously calls into
question the overriding importance of economic
concentration as the source of economic growth
and draws attention to the importance of local
and regional institutions in the process of
economic development, identifying a ‘new
paradigm’ of regional policy. This focuses on
tapping under-utilized economic potential, cre-
ating integrated development programmes, and
developing soft infrastructures organized in
relation to functional economic areas rather
than administrative boundaries, all of which
require the development of multi-level govern-
ance capacity. However, the OECD’s work also
highlights some of the limits in the theory and
understanding of institutions: while the role of
human capital, innovation and physical infra-
structure can be statistically modelled, the role
of institutions cannot, so they appear in the
analysis as a deus ex machina or ‘magic dust’
revealed only by qualitative, case-study rese-
arch, which makes comparison difficult, the
results difficult to generalize and policy impli-
cations uncertain. Nevertheless, the OECD
study is evidence of the growing policy salience
of the role of institutions in local and regional
development and has been used to justify the
effectiveness of ‘place-based’ development
policies, which have been advocated also in
other major recent official contributions (Barca,
2009; White House, 2010; see also Barca et al.,
2012).
The focus on ‘place-based’ regional policy in
the EU prompts Charron et al. (2012a, 2012b) to
address the variations in the ‘Quality of Govern-
ment’ (QoG) between and, especially, within
Member States. Quality of government (QoG)
refers to government that is impartial, efficient
and non-corrupt and which leads to outcomes
such as better economic performance. It refers
not to formal rules as such but qualities of
day-to-day functioning of governments, which
are examined using proxy measures of citizen
satisfaction. Accordingly, within the EU, subna-
tional differences in QoG are often more impor-
tant than national differences. Thus, in addition
to a ‘place’ effect and a ‘people’ effect, a ‘gov-
ernment’ effect may also contribute to emer-
gence of geographic inequalities. Charron
et al. conclude that in the EU context a region
with a low QoG will not be able to use Cohesion
Funds efficiently and effectively and will
remain trapped in a low growth and low QoG
equilibrium protected from its consequences
by structural funds transfers.
III Uneven geography of regional
institutions
Gertler has argued recently that economic geo-
graphers have tended to ignore the role of insti-
tutions in shaping patterns of development and,
as a result, are ‘standing on the sidelines of the
social science’ (Gertler, 2010: 12); an outcome
of the discursive dead end of postmodernism.
In fact there are a number of ways in which a
concern with the role of regional institutions has
been reflected in recent geographical work that
theorizes the economy as a sociocultural pro-
cess, founded on contested norms and values
to which institutions give expression and which
shape the incentives for investment and enter-
prise (Martin, 2000; Wood and Valler, 2011).
Amin and Thrift (1995) proposed the presence
of ‘institutional thickness’ as explanation of the
superior performance of some regions, although
recent research has questioned the value of this
metaphor and instead has emphasized quality
and performance of institutions rather than their
density because ‘very similar institutional set-
tings work in different ways in different terri-
tories’ (Farole et al., 2011: 74). Analysis has
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involved the search for an elusive ‘devolution
dividend’, while the role of institutions looms
large in discussions of the ‘learning region’ or
the performance of development agencies
(Bellini et al., 2012; Morgan, 2006, 2007; Pike
et al., 2012; Rodrı´guez-Pose and Gill, 2005).
‘Leadership’ has been suggested as another
ingredient in ‘regional success’ (Sotarauta
et al., 2012). Regional institutions have also been
analysed in terms of their contribution to eco-
nomic ‘lock-ins’ that account for the failure of
industrial regions to adapt to economic crises
(e.g. Grabher, 1993; Hassink, 2007) and more
broadly to patterns of path dependency (Martin,
2010). Surveying the treatment of institutions,
Hanssen et al. (2011) conclude that, in economic
geography, government is treated instrumentally
as a support for development and growth, while
questions of politics, democracy and multi-level
governance are neglected.
Paasi (2009, 2011) has focused on the pro-
cess by which regions are formed and institutio-
nalized. Here, the region is considered as a
cultural and political construction which takes
on a territorial and symbolic shape – becomes
bounded – as a prelude to institution building,
before being incorporated into the territorial
system of society. Rather than instruments
responding to the exigencies of market pressures,
regional institutions here give expression to iden-
tities and ‘come to exist and take on significance
only in the context of their wider political and
institutional settings’ (Agnew, 2013: 12).
Regional institutions are the outcome of territo-
rially based political struggles, while multi-
level governance ‘is itself an endogenous
outcome of struggles among the powerful for
advantage’ (Faguet, 2013: 9). In sum, in human
geography, regional institutions tend to be
viewed through (largely separate) lenses, one
which emphasizes their instrumental contribu-
tion to economic performance and one which
emphasizes their role in the expression of politi-
cally constructed spatial identities (Cumbers and
Mackinnon, 2011; Mackinnon et al., 2009). In
practice, the discourse of regional institution
building typically mixes both ‘identity’ and
‘economy’ claims at different times and in differ-
ent places (Rodrı´guez-Pose and Sandall, 2008).
Farole et al. (2011) conclude that that it is the
interactions between formal societal institutions
and the texture and pattern of group life – com-
munity – that determines how institutions per-
form and shape the process of economic growth.
Within the policies of international develop-
ment organizations, local and regional institu-
tions (‘decentralization’) are frequently tied to
the debate about ‘good governance’, which
emerged as a response to perceived failures of
development policies as a result of corruption,
inefficiency, lack of transparency and account-
ability (e.g. World Bank, 1997). Good govern-
ance offers a ‘hygienic’ or ‘technical’ approach
to what are essentially contentious political ques-
tions (Grindle, 2012: 267) and overlooks the
political constraints that shape economic and
institutional change (Dellepiane-Avellaneda,
2009: 214). However, the sense in which eco-
nomic development is a technical exercise
which is disturbed by an excess of politics is a
theme of the literature on regional institutions.
In their study of the impacts of devolved gov-
ernment on regional development in Sweden,
Hanssen et al. (2011) claim that policies:
bear signs of a compromise among political par-
ties, more than being a suitable and effective strat-
egy for enhancing economic development in the
region . . . Thus, politicians, often being political
players and responsible for fulfilling their politi-
cal promises in many sectors and for many geo-
graphical areas, might therefore be less suited
for setting tough, discriminating objectives to
ensure economic development than national
agencies that represent professional competence.
(Hanssen et al., 2011: 48; see also Walker, 2002)
The literature on ‘varieties of capitalism’ empha-
sizes the degree to which the behaviour of firms is
embedded in national institutional environments
that manage sectional conflicts in ways that
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shape social and economic trajectories (Hall and
Soskice, 2001). Although providing an impor-
tant corrective to blandishments about globali-
zation, the emphasis on institutions as
equilibrium solutions neglects how actors mobi-
lize resources to impose or defend an institu-
tional order, ‘even when the outcomes of these
arrangements are suboptimal, inefficient and
inegalitarian’ (Peck and Theodore, 2007: 755).
As Acemoglu (2003: 29) observes, ‘institutions
not only affect the size of the social pie, but also
how it is distributed’, and this makes institu-
tional change politically contentious. A similar
insight emerges from literature on the ‘develop-
mental state’ which emphasizes how relation-
ships between government, industry and labour
shape patterns of growth, but pays attention to
the distributional consequences of these
arrangements (Chang, 2010; Evans, 2010).
Regional institutions frequently are presented
as mechanisms for the mitigation of collective
action problems in the face of the challenge of
development, but cooperation exists alongside
conflict and in this context ‘politics mediate the
relationship between institutions and economic
performance’ (Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2009:
211; see also Wood, 2011) – a point which
requires more attention from economists and
economic geographers.
IV Institutions, regions and the
political economy of development
The literature on the political economy of
growth, which is frequently referenced but less
often analysed in the discussion of regional
institutions, offers important insights on the role
of political institutions in the development pro-
cess. There is a strong case for geographers to
pay fuller attention to this literature (cf. Farole
et al., 2011). Helpman’s (2004) survey shows
how differences in rates of economic growth
can be attributed to the accumulation of physi-
cal and human capital and improvements in
total factor productivity, together with the
effects of technological change and how these
shape patterns of trade but, after accounting for
these contributions, substantial variation in rates
of growth remains. He concludes that more
research is required into the role of ‘political
institutions’, because these ‘frame the struggle
between the proponents of change and their
opponents and thereby affect the ability to inno-
vate and to implement new technologies’
(p. 112).
For North (1990, 1991, 2005), the long-run
evolution of the political-economic structure
of a society is key to how choices are made and
how they are able to shape economic policies
and contribute to ‘adaptive efficiency’; that is,
the ability of some societies to adjust to shocks
in a world characterized by ubiquitous uncer-
tainty and ergodicity and under conditions of
bounded rationality (cf. Simon, 1972). Institu-
tions are the ‘scaffolding that shapes human
interaction’ (North, 2005: 48) or ‘the rules of the
game in a society; more formally, the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interac-
tion’ (North, 1990: 477). North eschews the
rationality assumption which is central to con-
ventional economics and asks for a deeper
understanding of cognitive processes and how
these are shaped by an inherited ‘artifactual
structure’; that is, the slowly accumulated
beliefs, institutions, tools, instruments and tech-
nology that shape the choices of agents. Institu-
tions integrate the diverse knowledge and
beliefs that are necessary to solve economic
problems, but the structure of the decision-
making process determines whose beliefs mat-
ters, and there are limits to choices arising from
‘the combination of beliefs, institutions, and
artifactual structure that have been inherited
from the past’ (North, 2005: 80). North asserts
the primacy of politics: ‘It is the polity that
defines and enforces the economic rules of the
game and therefore is the primary source of eco-
nomic performance’ (North, 2005: 57). Political
decisions are of a different character to economic
decisions, reflecting complex, moral, ethical and
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‘non-rational’ reasoning – or ‘diverse rational-
ities’ (DiMaggio, 1998) – but create the condi-
tions in which markets and economies evolve.
In this sense the development process is never
simply a technical exercise.
Economic growth, in this perspective, is the
result of the interaction of demographic change,
knowledge and institutions, while growth is
inhibited when the artifactual structure ‘gives
rise to organizations whose survival depends
on the perpetuation of those institutions and
devote resources to preventing any alteration
that threatens their survival’ (North, 2005: 52).
Successful institutions often have ‘heterodox
elements’ and combine ‘orthodox elements with
local heresies’ (Rodrik, 2003: 13). Thus, Help-
man (2004) concludes that institutions affect the
incentives to reorganize production and distri-
bution and to accumulate physical and human
capital and, therefore, ‘are more fundamental
determinants of economic growth than R&D
or capital accumulation, human or physical’
(p. 139).
Despite the growth of scholarship in this
field, Dellepiane-Avellaneda (2009: 203) emp-
hasizes ‘our imperfect understanding of how
politics interacts with institutions in shaping
development policies and outcomes’. Acemo-
glu and Robinson (2012) explore this relation-
ship, distinguishing between inclusive and
extractive institutions in both the economy and
polity. Societies characterized by inclusive
institutions distribute power broadly, ensuring
the proceeds of growth are allocated equitably.
Societies characterized by extractive institu-
tions limit political rights and redistribute
resources to elites that have few incentives to
invest and innovate. History matters because
of the importance of ‘critical junctures’ – that
is, major events or combinations of factors
disrupting the existing economic or political
balance in society that shape the path of eco-
nomic and political institutions and lead to the
creation of inclusive or extractive institutions
through a process of ‘institutional drift’ – a
process which is not predetermined but entirely
contingent (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
The literature on institutions and develop-
ment, which has its roots in scholarship on the
political economy of growth, has been devel-
oped chiefly to explain differences in economic
growth between countries and has tended to
provide general inspiration to the debate on
regional institutions rather than informing
detailed research designs. Apart from sugges-
tive statements about the institutional change
in the American South (Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2012: 351–357; North, 1990) and in La
Rioja in Argentina (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012: 384–388), this literature pays little atten-
tion to differences in subnational economic per-
formance. But this body of theory has great
relevance to the discussion of qualities and
capacities of regional institutions, the nature
of path dependency and, especially, the political
factors that shape incentives for economic
action. Farole et al. (2011) emphasize that geo-
graphers can enrich this debate by synthesizing
and systematizing their insights into the
embeddedness of economic agents in both terri-
tories and networks and how these affect micro-
economic outcomes in a local context.
V Research agendas
The contribution of political institutions to
regional development has garnered increasing
attention from scholars and policy-makers, but
this remains a nascent field of study which
opens many avenues for further research, some
of which are addressed below.
The global trend to decentralized governance
occurs at a critical juncture. Notably, the con-
temporary rise of regional institutions has been
theorized as an aspect of the crisis of the Keyne-
sian/Fordist state and the search for a new insti-
tutional order. The Keynesian state typically
accorded a subordinate role to local and
regional institutions which ‘were generally per-
ceived as entities through which the state
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fulfilled its objectives, rather than places of
policy-making that needed to be legitimized in
their own right’ (Tijmstra, 2011: 37). The crisis
of the Keynesian state has destabilized the
nationalized scalar fix and sparked the search
for new (multi-scalar) ones (Brenner, 2009;
Pike and Tomaney, 2009). A perceived failure
of the Keynesian/Fordist state was its suppres-
sion of ‘the necessary role of local knowledge
and knowhow’ (Scott, 1998: 6) in the flawed
pursuit of ‘legibility’, that is total mastery of
social and economic processes. The rise of
regional institutions reflected in part the belief
that nationally managed Keynesianism was
insufficiently adept at overseeing large-scale
and diverse regional change, providing evi-
dence that ‘illegibility . . . remains a reliable
resource for political autonomy’ (Scott, 1998:
54). A diversity of regional institutions, more-
over, creates the conditions for political innova-
tion, as expressed in Louis Brandeis’ famous
dissenting US Supreme Court judgement: ‘It is
one of the happy accidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country’ (New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 USA 262, 311, 1932).
In the post-Keynesian era, regional and local
institutions assume, then, ‘an increasingly for-
mative role in shaping economic activity’ as
part of a general shift from macro-economic
regulation to a more decentralized regime of
‘micro-socio-institutional regulation’ (Martin,
2000: 91; see also Crouch et al., 2009). Hall and
Soskice (2001) seek to explain the institutional
‘varieties of capitalism’ in terms of differences
in the micro-economics of firm behaviour and
labour markets and their regulation (see Crouch
et al., 2009, for an attempt to extend this
approach to the regional scale). However, while
it is vital to assess how regions with ostensibly
similar assets and endowments adapt differ-
ently, we also require an awareness of how
regions are embedded in wider political-
economic-territorial frameworks (Mackinnon
et al., 2009).
To date, research has demonstrated the vari-
able quality of regional institutions but has yet
to illuminate the processes which produce such
differences, leading Charron et al. (2012a: 15)
to ask ‘which cultural legacies, economic vari-
ables or institutional factors may explain the
notable regional differences on governance?’.
Farole et al. (2011) identify the need ‘to shed
light on when such identities bring groups
together under a common governance frame-
work in such a way that there is ongoing
growth-enabling problem solving, and when
such identities effectively lead to paralysis and
stasis’ (p. 71). Brenner and Wachsmuth (2012)
suggest that territorial alliances to promote eco-
nomic growth within a particular city or region
are generally embedded in social groups that are
themselves entrenched in immobile infrastruc-
tures and fixed capital. But even in regions with
similar economic profiles, the forms and out-
comes of such alliances are diverse (Putnam,
1993; Safford, 2009). In short, we need ‘a richer
account of where good institutions come from,
the shape they take, and how they need to evolve
to support long-term growth’ (Rodrik, 2003: 12).
The methodological challenges of studying
the impacts of regional institutions are signifi-
cant. As Rodrı´guez-Pose (2013) notes, the ques-
tion of endogeneity looms large in this debate:
institutions are both cause and consequence of
economic development and this makes the study
of their impacts especially challenging. From
markedly different theoretical starting points,
both Chang (2011) and Glaeser et al. (2004)
dispute the evidence that institutions cause eco-
nomic growth rather than growth improving
institutions. To date, quantitative analyses have
been better at highlighting differences in the
quality of institutions but largely unsuccessful
at providing explanations for these differences.
Rodrik (2003) argues that case studies and
econometric analyses are not substitutes in the
study of institutions, but rather are
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complementary, and makes the case for the use
of ‘analytical narratives’, albeit this approach to
date has rather narrowly drawn on rational
choice and game theory to develop its explana-
tory frameworks. But there is a strong case for
developing approaches – such as the extended
case method proposed by Burawoy (1998) – that
recognize the importance of both context specifi-
city and the historical contingency of institutional
development. Farole et al. (2011) observe that
geographers have contributed important insights
into how local institutions matter that could
enhance this debate; the challenge is to systema-
tize these findings through larger-scale quantita-
tive and qualitative studies grounded in
generalizable frameworks in order to identify the
regularities in how institutions shape economic
performance.
Finally, we must place our deliberations about
the role of local and regional government in the
context of debates about the relationship between
democracy and development. For Sen (1999:
153), ‘debate, criticism, and dissent, are central
to the processes of generating informed and
reflected choices . . . [and] are crucial to the for-
mation of values and priorities’. Preferences can-
not be given independently of public discussion,
while open dialogue is often underestimated in
assessing social and political problems. How-
ever, as the literature on the developmental state
highlights, rapid economic growth can occur
under authoritarian political institutions. Despite
the recent growth in the number of democratic
jurisdictions, moreover, such societies are them-
selves being transformed by the growth of judi-
cial activism, the decline of mass politics and
electoral participation, the growth of corporate
influence and the rise in inequality (e.g. Crouch,
2004). These arguments are amplified under
conditions of austerity, where democratic institu-
tions, including local and regional governments,
become transmission mechanisms for the priori-
ties of ‘global capital’, ‘bond markets’ and other
such abstractions (Streeck and Scha¨fer, 2013;
Tomaney et al., 2010).
A number of conclusions for the debate on
regional development can be drawn from this dis-
cussion. First, institutions develop over the long
run. The creation of effective institutions might
be critical for regional development, but they can-
not offer a quick fix. Second, institutions are con-
cerned not merely with establishing the technical
conditions for growth but also with the produc-
tion of social and political values and are the focus
for questions of what kind of local and regional
development and for whom (Pike et al., 2007).
Finally, the task of translating these insights into
policy recommendations has hardly begun.
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